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NOTES
PRETRIAL DIscovERY IN CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS:
AN EVALUATION
Eminent domain is generally defined as the power of the nation
or sovereign state to take, or to authorize the taking of, private
property for a public use without the consent of the owner. This
taking is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation.'
In a government of limited and specified powers such as ours, the
power of eminent domain must be exercised as provided by law.2
Thus, the use of the condemnation power is subject to all the
prohibitions found in the 'constitution, namely: (1) the require-
ments of just compensation, and (2) the due process clauses of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments which allow the property
owner opportunity to be heard and to contest the issues involved
in the taking.
Since in every taking the exercise of eminent domain powers
is conditioned upon the payment of a fair and just compensation,
the primary concern in the past centered on the determination of
the meaning and application of this term. The United States
Supreme Court noted that just compensation meant a full and
perfect equivalent in money for the property taken,3 and also
that the compensation to an owner of property should be reciprocal,
i.e., it must be fair to the state as well as to the owner.4 Further-
more, since each parcel of land is unique, the valuation of real
property is an issue particularly within the realm of the trial court.5
This concern, with regard to the determination of the meaning
of just compensation, focused upon substantive law questions, e.g.,
whether damages should be awarded for loss of good will, moving
expenses, and permanent fixtures appurtenant to the land. How-
ever, time and a plentitude of judicial decisions have settled most
of the substantive just compensation problems.6 , Today, the
'Il re Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, 164 Ohio St. 377, 131 N.E.2d 397 (1955),
appeal disinissed, Ellis v. Ohio Turnpike Comni'n, 352 U.S. 806, rehearing
denied, 352 U.S. 945 (1956).2 New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836).
3 Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S: 312, "326 (1893).
4 Ibid.
5 United States v. Lambert, 146 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1944).
6 A.B.A. REPORT OF CommiTE ON CONDE NATIoN AxD CoNDEMNAT N
PROCEDURE 137 (1965)' [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. ,REroRT].
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procedural aspects of condemnation suits are being emphasized,7
particularly in the area of pretrial discovery of appraisers and their
reports. This emphasis on pretrial procedure seems to arise from
the very nature of a condemnation action. Since an eminent domain
proceeding involves the extensive use of technical terms and expert
witnesses, pretrial discovery tends to reduce trial preparation. Also,
a liberal discovery procedure increases the possibility of settlement
and tends to give a more equitable treatment to both condemnor
and condemnee5 Emphasis upon pretrial technique appears to be
further warranted from the relationship of the parties in a con-
demnation action. In no other civil action is the power of sov-
ereignty, public interest and individual interest more intertwined.
The condemnor, whether federal or state, not only owes a duty
to the public to acquire the land at a price no higher than the
reasonable market value, but also is obliged to pay the condemnee
a just compensation. The current question is whether this obliga-
tion should be examined solely by looking at the monetary award,
or whether the criterion of just compensation requires examination
into the methods used by the sovereign in determining the com-
pensation figure.
The purpose of this note is to analyze and evaluate the pre-
trial discovery procedures employed by the federal government and
the various states, particularly New York, with regard to appraisal
reports and their use by parties to the litigation. Particular emphasis
will be placed on the problem of whether the just compensation
principle might require a free disclosure of all such reports in a
condemnation proceeding.
Procedural Aspects of the Problem
The general standards for discovery and pretrial procedures
in the federal district courts are contained in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.9 Implicit in these discovery rules is the principle
that mutual knowledge of all relevant evidence and issues prior to
trial is essential to the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition
of the litigation.'0 Rule 26 is of primary importance because it
establishes the fundamentals necessary for the application of the
discovery statutes. It states that discovery is extended to any
person," and
7 Ibid.
s Goldstein, The Discovery Process in Highway Land Acquisition, 14 Am.
U.L. Rrv. 38, 40 (1964).
9 FED. _ Cirv. P. 16, 26-37, 45.
lo FF. R. Civ. P. 1 states that the rules "shall be construed to secure the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."
"1 FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(a).
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any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action . . . . It is not ground for objection that
the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. 12
The vague concept of "reasonably calculated" has generally been
taken to mean "relevant," not under the normal concept of "limited
by the pleadings," but in a broader sense of "whether the discovery
will serve any substantial purpose. s1 3 Thus, if a deponent refuses
to answer any question "reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence," a motion may be made to compel
an answer.
14
In pretrial condemnation proceedings, federal rules 33 and 34
are of primary importance. At the outset it should be noted,
however, that these rules are merely means to achieve discovery
of certain material, and that before these means may properly be
employed, the material sought to be discovered must be allowable
under rule 26. Rule 33 provides that a party may serve written
interrogatories upon an adverse party. In condemnation proceedings,
these interrogatories usually relate to the value an appraiser placed
upon a certain parcel of land and the various factors he used
to determine this valuation. Rule 34 establishes a procedure
whereby, upon motion of a party showing good cause, the court
may order another party to produce and permit the inspection and
copying of any designated document, not privileged, which might
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in
the pending action. This motion usually takes the form of a
request to examine the appraisal report. It is interesting to note
that under rule 34, the party seeking discovery is charged with the
burden of proving the justness of the discovery, whereas under
the other rules, the person against whom discovery is sought has
the burden of showing prejudice. 5
The rules regarding discovery simply provide guides to be
followed in seeking disclosure. Although the purpose behind these
rules was to make the trial a fair contest with full disclosure of
the basic facts and issues,", it was not until the decision of
Hickman v. Taylor 1 that the Supreme Court attempted to formulate
definitive standards for interpretation and control of discovery pro-
cedures. The issue in that case was whether pretrial procedural
devices could be used to inquire into material collected by an
-2 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). (Emphasis added.)
13 Goldstein, vtpra note 8, at 46-47.
1 Fm. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
'5 Winner, Procedural Methods To Attain Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 97 (1960).
16 See United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
17 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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adverse party's counsel in the course of preparation for litigation.
The Court stated that
deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treat-
ment. No longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve
to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his
opponent's case .... The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances
the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial
to the period preceding it .... is
The Court explained that where relevant non-privileged facts were
hidden, and these facts were essential to the preparation of one's
case, discovery might properly be had.1 9 Despite this liberal premise,
the Court further noted that not even the most liberal theory could
justify an invasion into the files and mental impressions of an
attorney. This material was privileged as the "work product"
prepared by an attorney in preparation for litigation.2°
The holding of this case has caused doubt as to the liberality
that had been imposed on the federal rules applicable to discovery.
It has led some courts to place an overemphasis on the existence
of facts as opposed to mental processes. For example, in con-
demnation cases, a distinction is often drawn between the discovery
of a fact, i.e., the existence, use and market value of certain land,
and the mental process used by an appraiser to arrive at a finding
of value. However, the case has seemed to foster a greater aware-
ness that these federal rules should be applied as the facts of the
case might indicate.
Aside from the problem of how the federal discovery rules
should be applied, a condemnation proceeding presents a further
and distinct problem in the discovery area. In most instances,
the condemnee is seeking information in the form of interrogatories
of the appraiser or an examination of the appraisal. In both
instances, the condemnee is seeking information from an expert
witness. Generally, the courts have decided this issue of expert
discovery without regard to the procedural device employed.21 The
issue in almost every case has been whether the discovery rules
extend to experts, and, if so, what is the scope of their application.2
2
1s Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
'oId. at 511.20 1d. at 510.21 E.g., United States v. 900.57 Acres of Land, 30 F.R.D. 512 (W.D.
Ark. 1962) (motion under rule 34); United States v. 6.82 Acres of Land,
18 F.R.D. 195 (D.N.M. 1955) (motion to quash subpoena duces tecum under
rule 45); United States v. 50.34 Acres of Land, 12 F.R.D. 440 (E.D.N.Y.
1952) (motion to limit examinations under rule 30(b)).
22 See, e.g., United States v. Certain Acres of Land, 18 F.RtD. 98 (M.D.
Ga. 1955) wherein the court said, "the question for decision boils down
basically to the extent of discovery which will be ordered . . . from an
adverse party's experts." Id. at 100.
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The opinions on this question have ranged from allowing full
disclosure of an appraiser's conclusions, 3 to an absolute denial of
disclosure of the name of the appraiser employed by the condemnor
or condenmee.
2 4
Case Approach to Discovery
While the relevance of expert opinion varies according to the
matters contested at trial, there is little doubt that in eminent
domain cases the expert occupies a particularly significant position.
In most instances, the value to be placed upon the taken property
is the sole issue before the court, and the opinions of the experts
usually constitute the sole evidence upon which a conclusion can
be reached. Nevertheless, an analysis of the cases shows that one
(or more) of the following defenses has been used successfully to
defeat disclosure of appraisals and appraisers' opinions in con-
demnation cases: (1) a fact-opinion distinction which will allow
disclosure as to the facts used by an appraiser in reaching his
conclusion as to value, but will deny disclosure as to the mental
processes (opinion) used by such expert and the weight assigned
to the different elements present in evaluating property; (2) an
attorney-client privilege (in a condemnation proceeding the state
is the client and usually a district attorney is the attorney) ; (3) a
work product privilege which exempts material prepared by an
attorney in preparation for trial; (4) a finding of fundamental
unfairness in allowing one party to the suit to incur expenses in
procuring expert opinion and then compelling him to disclose the
findings to the adverse party free of cost.
The fact-opinion defense was established in United States v'.
6.82 Acres of Land,2 5 wherein the defendant-condemnees sought
to take depositions of plaintiff's expert witnesses by serving a
subpoena duces tecum upon each of the prospective deponents pur-
suant to rule 34. The condemnor resisted on the ground that
the documents sought contained investigative reports prepared by
the plaintiff's experts, and, therefore, a disclosure in advance of
trial of the opinions and findings of these experts would be
prejudicial to the character and quality of the testimony at the
trial. The court stated that the defendant had failed to sustain
the burden of showing good cause which was required in a, motion
under rule 34. It found that since the physical factors which
contributed to the value of the property were open to inspection
23 United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md. 1963);
United States v. 3,595.98 Acres of Land, 212 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1962);
United States v. 50.34 Acres of Land, 13 F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).2 4 United States v. 6.82 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 195 (D.N.M. 1955).
25 Ibid.
[ VOL. 42
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by the opposing parties, the defendant was actually seeking to
force disclosure of the mental processes used by the appraiser in
determining the land's value. "Such expert opinions are subject
to protection from cross-examination, impeachment and contradiction
until, upon the trial on the merits, the trier of fact can alone
evaluate . . ." the expert opinion.
26
In another case,2 7 the condemnees filed motions for production,
inspection and copying of documents. The condemnor argued
that the opinions of experts were not discoverable. Although the
court recognized that the issue was one of determining just com-
pensation and that rules 33 and 34 should be construed liberally,
it stated that the information sought, and not the mere fact of a
motion, should determine whether discovery motions should be
granted. Since the condemnee had the burden of proof and since
the land was equally available for his own inspection, the court
denied the condemnee use of the condemnor's reports. The
"good cause" submitted by the conden-ee was that each of the
condemnor's appraisers had valued the land at more than the
government had deposited at the time of the taking, and con-
sequently the condemnee was prejudiced. The court noted that
this down payment figure was immaterial and not a statement of
the maximum or minimum amount just compensation required.
It would appear that the fact-opinion defense is faulty in two
respects. First, it appears to limit the landowner's opportunity to
acquire just compensation. In seeking pretrial discovery, the con-
demnee is actually availing himself of an opportunity to prepare
for cross-examination at trial on the one relevant issue-just com-
pensation for his land. By limiting the discovery to actual facts,
the condemnee loses the chance to evaluate the means used by
an appraiser, and perhaps loses the opportunity for effective
refutation. Secondly, while an expert's opinion would not be
26 1d. at 197. (Emphasis added.) See also United States v. Certain
Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224, 233 (S.D. Cal. 1953), where the court noted
that the opinion of experts was wholly immaterial as evidence until the
expert was called as a witness and shown to be competent to testify as to
the value of the property. Numerous other decisions have declared that
an adverse party might have discovery as to the facts but not as to the ex-
pert opinion of an appraiser. E.g., United States v. 284,392 Sq. Ft. of Floor
Space, 203 F. Supp. 75 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. 19.897 Acres of
Land, 27 F.R.D. 420 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); United States v. 50.34 Acres of Land,
12 F.R.D. 440 (E.D.N.Y. 1952). The fact-opinion defense has also been
sustained despite the condemnee's argument that since the sole issue in a
condemnation proceeding was just compensation, he had shown good cause
by contending that production of the appraisal reports would narrow the
issues at trial. United States v. 4.724 Acres of Land, 31 F.R.D. 290 (E.D.
La. 1962).
27 United States v. 900.57 Acres of Land, 30 F.R.D. 512 (W.D. Ark.
1962).
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admissible as evidence until he is qualified by the court, it does
not necessarily follow that such an opinion could not lead to
admissible evidence within the relevance criterion of rule 26(b).
As mentioned above, the attorney-client privilege and an
application of the work product rule are also frequently used as
grounds for dismissing pretrial discovery motions. The attorney-
client privilege is usually asserted where the state, through its
agent, the hired appraiser, receives information on the value of
the land which it transmits to the attorney for his use in the
preparation of the condemnation case.
The work product privilege primarily arises where the attorney
hires the appraiser as his own agent. In this case, the product of
the appraiser is deemed to be the product of the attorney who has
gathered this material in preparation for trial. However, it seems
clear that unlike an attorney's own impressions or those of his
client, "the opinions and conclusions of an expert constitute evidence
in themselves, and may be the only way in which to establish
facts material to the case." s It should be emphasized that it is
these opinions and conclusions which are sought as evidence. Thus,
it would appear inequitable to protect them merely because they
have been given to an attorney.2 9 Further, the work product
theory, as it evolved in Hickman, did not absolutely deny discovery
to opinions and conclusions, but merely limited the discovery to
cases where good cause could be shown. It would appear that,
by the very nature of the condemnation proceeding which involves
the exercise of sovereign power, together with the twofold obligation
to render fairness to both the public and the individual, it can be
argued that good cause always exists. The condemnee is being
ousted from his land against his wishes, and all he seeks is just
compensation. Hence, in this type of proceeding, the limitation
of any means that could be exercised to combat the condemnor's
strength would seem to be unacceptable.30
The fourth, and perhaps newest of the defenses, is a denial
of discovery on the ground that it would be unfair to enable one
party to use another's trial preparation without paying com-
pensation. 31 But, where valuation is the sole issue, there appears
to be nothing unfair in allowing one party to know what his
28 Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert TIfarna-
tirn, 14 STA. L. REv. 455, 473 (1962).
291d. at 472. See also United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15
F.R.D. 224, 234 (S.D. Cal. 1953), which noted that if the court granted
discovery, this would constitute " 'the taking of property without due process
of law.'
30 See United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md.
1963) and authorities cited therein.
3L Ibid.
[ VOL. 42
NOTES
adversary intends to prove.3 2  In addition, simply because one
party to a litigation knows what a witness will say does not
necessitate the conclusion that he will become a witness for that
party.33  On the contrary, in the majority of condemnation cases,
the condemnee, by the use of pretrial procedures, is merely
attempting to gain information which will be relevant to the final
determination of just compensation. If a further problem arises
as to the payment of the expert, it appears that there is no reason
why a court could not condition disclosure upon the payment of
a reasonable portion of the fee by the party seeking discovery.34
Although the majority of cases hold that the opinions and
conclusions of expert witnesses (appraisers) are exempt from
pretrial discovery, there are a number of well-reasoned decisions
which have allowed full discovery. It should be noted that these
cases, in deciding the question of discovery, place emphasis on
the very nature of the condemnation proceeding and the problems
contained therein. They do not merely apply the rules developed
for expert witnesses in general.
The earliest condemnation case to allow full discovery was
United States v. 50.34 Acres of Land.3' There, the defendant
brought a rule 34 motion to inspect the appraisal reports of the
condemnor. The defendant alleged that the plaintiff-condemnor
had used two reputable appraisers and that the latter planned to
use neither of the two as witnesses at the trial because they had
reported findings of value which were unfavorable to the con-
demnor. The court held that since the government had obtained
the reports for the express purpose of determining compensation
and neither the reports nor the authors were available to the
defendant, the condemnee was entitled to inspect the contents
of the appraisal reports. Accordingly, the "good cause" require-
ments of rule 34 had been satisfied by the defendant's allegation
that the condemnor was not going to use the reports as evidence
because they were unfavorable to its position. Most important,
however, was the manner in which the court dismissed the con-
demnor's objection that the subject matter sought to be discovered
was privileged material within the prohibition of rule 26. It tested
the discoverability of the appraiser's reports by the principle
of relevancy contained in rule 26 and stated that "there can be
no question as to the relevancy of the documents, as they bear
32 For a position that, in condemnation cases, the strict adversary system
should be abandoned see Goldstein, The Discovery Process in Highway Land
Acquisitions, 14 Au. U.L. REv. 38 (1964).
33 See Von Kalinowski, Use Of Discovery Against The Expert Witness,
40 F.R.D. 43 (1966).
34 4 Moopa, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1126.24, at 1531 (2d ed. 1966).35 13 F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
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directly on the question of just compensation for land involved
in a condemnation action." 36
A more recent case 37 posed the same problem. The court,
in a lengthy and well-reasoned decision, attacked the various
defenses that had, arisen in pretrial procedures. It almost sum-
marily dismissed the attorney-client and work product defenses
noting that since by its very nature expert opinion was subjective,
there was actually no basis to believe that the information sought
could be obtained in any manner other than disclosure. However,
the court was much more concerned with the unfairness defense.
It reasoned that, unlike certain states and their political subdivisions,
there was no obligation imposed upon the federal government,
as a condition precedent to the exercise of its power of condemna-
tion, to negotiate with the landowner and demonstrate in court
that the condemnee had been offered just compensation and refused
such allowance.3 On the contrary, the federal government could
institute a suit in eminent domain without notice to the landowner,
and, by filing a declaration of taking and depositing a sum in court,
obtain title to the land sought before the condemnee was aware
of the proceedings. Thus, the court concluded, the sole issue in
any condemnation case must be the question of just compensation,
and, in determining this question, experts must be employed be-
cause the property owner is usually ignorant of the value of his
own land. Therefore,
where value is the basic, if not sole, issue in litigation, it is not unfair
for either party to know in advance of trial what the other party intends
to prove, what opinions his opponent's experts hold, the method by which
those opinions were formulated and the facts upon which they are
based.39
The movement towards recognition of the need for pretrial
discovery in eminent domain cases has been highlighted recently
36 United States v. 50.34 Acres of Land, 13 F.R.D. 19, 21 (E.D.N.Y.
1952). (Emphasis added.) For a criticism of this case and a statement
that it was decided because of the existence of extraordinary facts see United
States v. 900.57 Acres of Land, supra note 27.
37United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.RD. 593 (D. Md. 1963).
See also United States v. 3,595.98 Acres of Land, 212 F. Supp. 617 (N.D.
Cal. 1962).
38 United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, id. at 597. For an example of
state statutes which recognize the importance of pretrial negotiations see foot-
notes 68 & 87 infra.
39 United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, id. at 597. Note that the court,
although recognizing that unfairness had to be tested by federal law, took
notice that Maryland law allowed for full discovery in condemnation cases
and that the results were that issues were sharpened, trial time was reduced
and fair settlements were encouraged.
[ Vor.. 42
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in federal legislative investigations. 40  In analyzing the problem,
the Committee on Public Works noted that there were reports
of many persons who had suffered major hardships and financial
losses in compensation cases due to a lack of uniformity in the
various federal programs. It appeared that citizens were paid
varying amounts depending on the program involved rather than
the immediate loss suffered.4 ' The Committee emphasized that the
federal government must play an active role in the fair handling
of condemnation cases. This is so because federal moneys are
instrumental in the acquisitions of approximately 1.4 million acres
of privately owned land per year at a compensation rate of 1.3
billion dollars, 395 million dollars coming from federal sources. 42
Recognizing that it is the duty of the federal government
to pay landowners just compensation, the report recommended
that every "federal agency should provide the property owner
with reasonable information concerning its opinion of the value
of the property." 4 The Committee reported that some of the
agencies offer approximately seventy-five percent of the owners
less than the agency-approved amount. One of these agencies
is the United States Army Engineers,44 which operates under a
40 COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDY OF COI-
PENSATION AND ASSISTANCE FOR PERSONS AFCTD By REAL PROPERTY
ACQUISITION IN EDERA AD FE.RALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS (ComM.
Print 1965) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC WORKS STUDY]. See also A.B.A.
REPORT 182.
41 PUBLIC WORKS STUDY 1.
4Id. at 10-11. Note also that the number of ownerships acquired by fed-
erally assisted programs averages 154,790 per year.
3Id. at 123.
44Id. at 117. "Purchases in which the initial offer was less than the
agency approved appraisal and actual purchases at less than the agency
approved appraisal."
Acquisition Purchases Purchases where agency Purchases made at
Program where data initial offer less than less than agency
available agency approved appraisal approved appraisal
Number Number Percent Number Percent
AcQuIsITmoxs
BY STATES OR
LOCALrIIEs
Urban Renewal 14,473 3,285 23 1,293 9
Federal-aid
highways 45,741 3,397 7 1,933 4
Low-rent
housing 1,341 764 57 454 34
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"one-price" policy, offering the condemnee a compensation figure
on a take it or leave it basis. Furthermore, their appraisers
do not even consult with landowners as to operations conducted
on the land. Therefore, the study concluded, such attitudes on
the part of the government precluded serious attempts to resolve
the varying differences that arose as to the value of the property.45
Some agencies will not reveal the exact amount of a particular
appraisal or the details surrounding its creation because they
believe that disclosure would lead to further controversy and that
it is confidential information in case the land has to be con-
demned. 6 The adversary approach of the federal government
was further emphasized when it was noted that in some cases,
a person who does not agree to accept the amount initially offered
receives only a portion of the agency's estimate upon surrender
of the land. The balance is not received until after the con-
demnation proceeding, thus often resulting in undue hardship upon
the condemnee who needs the money immediately to purchase new
land. Quite possibly this accounts for the ability of the govern-
ment to settle most claims at less than their full appraisal valuation.
Further, the Committee found that an agency might not condemn
the property if an owner refused to agree on a purchase price.
The threat of condemnation then undermines the title of the owner
to the land, causing a depreciation in value.4 7
The above findings concerning federal condemnation pro-
ceedings led to legislative action, although unsuccessful, in the 89th
Acquisition Purchases Purchases where agency Purchases made at
Program where data initial offer less than less than agency
available agency approved appraisal approved appraisal
Number Number Percent Number Percent
FFDERAL AGENCY
AcQuisroN
U.S. Army
Engineers Ac-
quisitions:
Civil Works 18,784 14,204 76 2,763 15
Local Coop-
eration 960 519 54 343 36
Army Military 192 142 74 32 17
Air Force 10,220 7,419 73 3,953 39
NASA 4,286 2,593 60 806 19
Total for Group 34,442 24,877 72 7,897 23
45Id. at 117-18.46 1d. at 402-03.
47A.B.A. REroar 185-86.
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Congress. 4s A resolution was proposed to afford fair and equitable
treatment to all persons affected by federal real property ac-
quisitions. Title I of the proposed legislation contained two im-
portant measures calculated to insure prospective condemnees fair
pretrial treatment :9 (1) all property should be appraised before
negotiation and the land owner should accompany the appraiser
during his inspection; and (2) after appraisal, the agency should
make a prompt offer which should not be less than the appraised
value approved by the agency. The agency would still acquire
several appraisals and use the lowest, but the condennee would
have a bargaining position not previously enjoyed.
In retrospect, federal procedures in pretrial condemnation
cases have been far from satisfactory. It is urged that the
federal government adopt a type of legislation similar to the act
proposed in 1965. By this means, it seems likely that a con-
demnee will be better able to adjudge true property value and
thus, more realistically, approach the problem of receiving just
compensation. It is further submitted that by lifting the veil
of secrecy that surrounds condemnation pretrial procedures, the
federal government will be in a more favorable position to
exercise its eminent domain powers within the dictates of law,
and offer the landowner the true value of his land.
The States
At the outset, it should be noted that a majority of the
states have adopted the federal discovery rules either in full or
in part. Therefore, much that has already been mentioned con-
cerning the various means used to deny disclosure in condemnation
proceedings in the federal courts is applicable to the states.
However, it appears that the state courts have taken a more
liberal view with respect to allowing the disclosure of appraisal
reports and conclusions of experts. This is evidenced in such
states as California, Arizona, Wisconsin and New York which
have, either judicially or legislatively, made provisions for man-
datory pretrial discovery in condemnation actions.
Case Law
An examination of the state judicial decisions relevant to
pretrial discovery in condemnation cases indicates that, although
-SFair Compensation Act of 1965, H.R. 3421, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. See
PUBLIC WORKS STUDY 147. Although this measure failed to pass, there
appears to be a good opportunity for its success the next time it reaches the
House floor.49 Fair Compensation Act of 1965, H.R. 3421, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. Title
I, Part A, § 101(a) (2), (3).
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the aforementioned four defenses applied in the federal courts
are available, the state courts have placed particular emphasis upon
the attorney-client privilege and the work product defense. How-
ever, the other defenses also have a substantial vitality. For
example, in Hornback v. State Highway Conm'nr,50 the Virginia
court, in applying the fact-opinion defense, denied disclosure on
the grounds that the land in question was open to all for examina-
tion, and that what the landowner actually sought was the ap-
praiser's opinion concerning the value of the property. This
decision was reached despite a Virginia Code provision which
permitted discovery of writings containing material evidence if
the moving party had no other means of acquiring this informa-
tion.51  Since the condemnee could examine the property and
ascertain value on his own behalf, the requisite need was found
lacking. In at least one state, this fact-opinion distinction has
been embodied into legislation, thus denying discovery of an expert
witness' value conclusions.5 2
Although the attorney-client privilege plays a forceful role in
state condemnation cases, certain jurisdictions have distinguished the
discovery of the principal-agent communication from, the discovery
of an independent contractor's opinion. In Brink v. Multnomah
County,53 the court held that the attorney-client privilege extended
to an appraiser's communication to a deputy district attorney
where the appraiser had been employed by the county. However,
the court indicated that this privilege would not extend to com-
munications which were prepared by the appraiser in his regular
course of business without reference to any existing or threatened
lawsuit.
Perhaps the most forceful argument advanced in any state
court against pretrial discovery in condemnation proceedings is
found in a recent case decided by the Superior Court of Con-
necticut.54 In this case, the court held that the reports of ap-
praisers were privileged in that a "good cause" prerequisite was
50 205 Va. 50, 135 S.E,2d 136 (1964). See also Edwards v. State High-
way Comm'r, 205 Va. 734, 139 S.E.2d 845 (1965); State v. Riverside Realty
Co., 152 So. 2d 345 (La. 1963).
51 VA. CODE § 8-325 (1957). Note that Rule of Court 3:23(c) in Virginia
provides that in civil actions at law, names and addresses of witnesses may
be discovered and any writing may be made available. But in Williamson v.
Hopewell Redev. & Housing Authority, 203 Va. 653, 125 S.E.2d 849 (1962),
the court held that the Rules of the Court were not applicable to eminent
domain proceedings.
52 IDAHo R. Civ. P. 26(b). See State v. Bair, 83 Idaho 475, 365 P.2d 216
(1961).
53224 Ore. 507, 356 P.2d 536 (1960). But see State Highway Comm'n v.
Earl, 143 N.W.2d 88 (S. D. 1966).
54 Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. Greater Hartford Flood Comm'n,
26 Conn. Supp. 1, 209 A.2d 681 (1965).
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not satisfied merely by the condemnee attempting to limit issues
and prepare for cross-examination. The court rejected the theory
that just compensation was the basic issue involved and found
that the real question was whether the condemnee had a right
to discover the condemnor's appraisal before trial. The court
indicated that since a condemnation proceeding was in essence
a civil action, it was actually no different from any other case
where experts testify and conflicts arise that must be resolved
at trial. The court concluded that appraisal reports were materials
gathered in preparation for trial and thus privileged by the work
product defense. This work product rule, similar to the one
enunciated in Hickman v. Taylor,55 has been substantially adopted
in at least eight states.50  In addition, several states, such as
Illinois 7 and Texas,5 s have legislatively granted absolute im-
munity to reports or documents made in preparation for trial.
This same result has been reached in several other states by
means of judicial decisions.5 9
Despite the fact that many of the states have strictly applied
the principles enunciated in the federal decisions which have denied
pretrial discovery, it is evident that several states, which in the
past denied discovery, are now permitting and encouraging free
disclosure in eminent domain cases.
In Rust v. Roberts,0 a California court held that the attorney-
client privilege was applicable in a situation where the condemnee
sought to compel disclosure of the contents of the appraiser's
reports which had been delivered confidentially to the state's
attorneys. A later decision circumvented this logic when it allowed
a defendant to examine an appraiser as to his subjective knowledge
and opinions. 1 In that case, the court reasoned that although
communications to a state's attorney were privileged, the defendant
was not seeking a disclosure of that communication. She sought
only the opinion of the expert with regard to the fair market value
of the property condemned. This inquiry goes only to matters
peculiarly within the subjective knowledge of the appraiser, as
55329 U.S. 495 (1947).56 Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nevada, New Jersey, Utah and
West Virginia. See Goldstein, mupra note 32, at 64 n.135.
57 ILL. REV. STAT. § 101.19-5(1956); see City of Chicago v. Harrison-
Halsted Bldg. Corp., 11 Ill. 2d 431, 143 N.E.2d 40 (1957).
58 TEx. R. Civ. P. 167.
"0 Neff v. Hall, 110 Ohio App. 519, 170 N.E.2d 77 (1959); State v.
Jensen, 362 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. 1962); State v. Washington Horse Breeders
Ass'n, 64 Wash. 2d 756, 394 P.2d 218 (1964).
00 171 Cal. App. 772, 341 P.2d 46 (1959).
01 People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v. Donovan, 57 Cal. 2d 346, 369
P.2d 1, 19 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1962). See San Diego Professional Ass'n v.
Superior Court of San Diego County, 58 Cal. 2d 194, 373 P.2d 448, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 384 (1962).
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distinguished from his disclosures to the condemnor's counsel.
The court concluded that "this knowledge, in and of itself, is not
privileged, nor does it acquire a privileged status merely because
it may have been communicated to the attorney." 62
In a more recent decision,6 3 the California court allowed full
discovery as to all the facts and opinions of an appraisal report
declaring that these items were not within the protection of the
attorney-client privilege. 64  The court stated that it could not hold
the material as privileged merely because it was the result of an
expert's mental calculations and was delivered to an attorney.
Further, in discussing the condemnor's contention that discovery
would be contrary to public policy, the court stated:
The purpose of the condemnation action . . . is to determine the fair
market value of the property. Assumedly, petitioner believes that its
appraisers have arrived at a fair market value. If public interest, as
the words are used in section 1881, would suffer by disclosure of the
fair market value of the condemned property, then the statute on
privilege would have to fall before the constitutional requirements that
no private property be taken without due process of law.6 5
As a result of these decisions, the California legislature adopted
a new pretrial system, effective July 1, 1963, which, in effect,
requires disclosure of appraisals, as well as a pretrial conference
system to better aid in the settlement of condemnation claims.66
Complete disclosure was allowed in a recent Wisconsin case
despite the condemnor's assertion of the attorney-client privilege
and the work product defense.67  The court emphasized that it
found no invasion of the proprietary rights of the experts in
such a situation. It reasoned that by allowing the pretrial dis-
covery, the condemnee would simply gain an opportunity to prepare
62 People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v. Donovan, mspra note 61, at
355, 369 P.2d at 5-6, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 477 (1962).
63 Oceanside Union School Dist. v. Superior Court of San Diego County,
58 Cal. 2d 180, 373 P.2d 439, 23 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1962).
14 Id. at 190 n.8, 373 P.2d at 444 n.8, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 381 n.8. The court
noted that although bound by the federal rule of Hickman v. Taylor, the
local rules for the United States District Courts, Northern and Southern
Districts, in California required parties in a condemnation action to disclose
the subject matter of appraiser's reports.
15 Id. at 187, 373 P.2d at 443, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 379. (Emphasis added.)
6WEsT ANN. CALIF. CODE CIV. PRoc. §§2016, 2019(b)(1), 2031(a)
(1963). McCoy, Pretrial It Eminent Domain Actions, 38 L. A. BAR BuLL.439 (1963); See Swartzman v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 2d 195, 41
Cal. Rptr. 721 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964). For a preshadowing of this system
see Carter, Pre-Trial in Condemnation Cases-A New Approach, 40 J. Am.
JuD. Soc'y 78 (1956).
16 State ex rel. Reynolds v. Circuit Court for Waukesha County, 15 Wis.
2d 311, 112 N.W.2d 686 (1961), rehearing denied, 113 N.W.2d 537 (1962).
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for cross-examination and assemble rebuttal material, whereas
the condemnor would merely lose the tactical advantage of with-
holding the testimony until the time of the trial. Despite the fact
that the Wisconsin courts had already recognized the need for
broad pretrial discovery in condemnation proceedings, it is sig-
nificant that the state has, in addition, amended its procedural
statutes to require the full disclosure of appraisal reports gathered
in preparation for determining just compensation.68
Although Iowa had originally adopted the work product
privilege as a defense in a condemnation proceeding,'9 it was later
rejected in Crist v. Iowa State Highway Convm'n.70 The court
rejected the condemnor's contention that the interrogatory called
for an expression of opinion and decided the case on the basis of
whether or not an answer would serve any substantial purpose.
The facts of this case highlight a problem which is prevalent in
pretrial condemnation proceedings. The appraiser against whom
discovery was sought had appraised the value of the land at
$18,500. Since this figure was far in excess of the value placed
upon the land by the condemnor's experts, and even in excess
of the condennee's appraisal, discovery would have been beneficial
to the condemnee. The court's reason for allowing discovery was
the twofold responsibility of the state of Iowa in a condemnation
proceeding: (1) the state must realize the property at a price
which was fair to the taxpaying public; and (2) in this taking,
the individual citizen was entitled to be fairly compensated."'
In response to the unfairness argument that had been raised by
the condemnor, the court concluded that the condemnor's "duty
to see that the condemnee is fairly paid for his land removes
any element of unfairness which might obtain in a similiar con-
troversy between private parties." 72
The reversal of position on pretrial discovery of appraiser's
reports may be found also in Florida. In an early case, the court
denied the taldng of depositions against three of the condemnor's
appraisers on the ground that the information sought was the
work product of the condemnor's attorney and not subject to
8 Wis. STAT. ANN. §§32.05(2), 32.06(2) require that the condemnor
shall have made at least one appraisal of all property to be acquired, and
§§32.05(3) (e), 32.06(3) require that the condemnor send notice that one
or more of the appraisals of the property on which his offer is based is
available for inspection.
69 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Goldstein, The Discovery
Process in Highway Land Acquisition, 14 Am. U.L. REV. 38 n.13 (1964).
70255 Iowa 615, 123 N.W2d 424 (1963).
71 Crist v. State Highway Comm'n, 255 Iowa 615, 123 N.W.2d 424 (1963).
72 Id. at 627, 123 N.W.2d at 431. See also State v. Vanderburgh Circuit
Court, 211 N.E.2d 131 (Ind. 1965).
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discovery.7 3  One year later, however, the Florida Supreme Court
ordered the condemnor to produce its appraiser's worksheets for
inspection by the condemnee. 74  The Florida court reviewed its
local authority and concluded that, in the ordinary case, data
compiled by experts constituted the work product of the attorney
or his agents.
Nevertheless, conceding that in private litigation the reports and
opinions of experts should be considered a 'work product' . . . we are
convinced that the 'work product' immunity should not extend to the
type of information sought in this eminent domain proceeding.75
The court realized that the rule it proposed was diametrically
opposed to the general rule in litigation, but "there is no in-
consistency because both rules are based upon sound public policy
when the sphere in which each operates is properly analyzed." 76
The court was particularly concerned with the "dog-eat-dog"
attitude that was prevalent in eminent domain proceedings. It
felt that in an action where land was taken without the consent,
and through no fault, of the owner, the condemnor should strive
to afford the owner all the prerequisites necessary to establish
full and just compensation. The court also believed that once an
appraisal has been revealed, the landowner might be more apt
to settle, with a resultant speedy and inexpensive determination
of the claim."
New York State
New York State has been active in the promulgation of rules
and law concerning pretrial discovery in condemnation cases. In
one of the earliest reported decisions on this subject, the court
held that it had the power to, and should, in the proper case,
direct the taking of a pretrial examination of an adverse party
in a condemnation case.78  Generally speaking, the New York
courts have permitted discovery of pertinent information in a
condemnation proceeding where the issue was one of determining
73 State Road Dep't v. Cline, 122 So. 2d 827 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1960).74 Shell v. State Road Dep't, 135 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1961). This case is
especially noteworthy because it allowed discovery not only against the
appraisers, but also against the appraisal reports. Goldstein, supra note
69, at 63.
75 Shell v. State Road Dep't, id. at 860.
716Ibid.
7 Id. at 861. See also State ex rel. Willey v. Whitman, 91 Ariz. 120,
370 P.2d 273 (1962).78 Algonquin Gas Transmission Co. v. Schwartz, 206 Misc. 437, 132
N.Y.S.2d 639 (Sup. Ct 1954). The court seems to limit the application of
this theory to cases where there is a bona fide issue as to the necessity of
the taking.
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just compensation or fair market value.79  However, in 1957, the
Court of Claims denied pretrial discovery on the grounds that
the material sought was confidential and investigatory in nature
and that the divulgence of such matters would prejudice the
stateY3 The court found that the work of the state appraisers
was an intrinsic part of the appropriation proceeding preliminary
to the filing of the legal papers and that what the condemnee
actually sought, discovery of expert opinion, was contrary to the
rule of allowing discovery of facts only.
Prior to 1963, all pretrial disclosure in New York was sub-
ject to the principles enunciated in the Civil Practice Act.$, In
that year, however, New York adopted the new Civil Practice
Law and Rules [hereinafter referred to as CPLR]. Although
these new rules substantially changed many of the old procedural
standards, they did not expand the scope or method of discovery.
Section 3101(a) of the CPLR establishes an initially broad
criterion which permits disclosure of "all evidence material and
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. . . ." How-
ever, this broad outline is significantly narrowed by the three
exceptions: (1) privileged matter;8 2 (2) the work product of
an attorney; " and (3) material prepared for litigation.84 The
first two categories are absolutely immune from disclosure, whereas
the third category is conditionally immune. If it can be shown
that although the item is material prepared for litigation, a change
in conditions has made the item not susceptible of duplication
and that withholding it will result in injustice or hardship, the
court may compel disclosure.
An example of the effect of CPLR 3101 on condemnation
cases is it the Matter of the City of New York. s5 In that case,
the effect of CPLR 3101(d) forced the court to reason that
since there was no indication that the appraisals at issue were
prepared exclusively for litigation, their purpose could have been
to aid the Board of Estimate in performing its functions or the
79I1 re Union Turnpike, 263 N.Y. 631, 198 N.E. 556 (1935); Power
Authority of the State of New York v. Kochan, 28 Misc. 2d 784, 216
N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct. 1961); In re Cross-Bronx Expressway, 195 Misc. 842,
82 N.Y.S.2d 55 (Sup. Ct 1948); Hewitt v. State, 27 Misc. 2d 930, 216
N.Y.S.2 615 (Ct. Cl.), aff'd, 11 App. Div. 2d 1079, 209 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1960).
80 Valley Stream Lawns, Inc. v. State, 6 Misc. 2d 607, 164 N.Y.S.2d
482 (Ct Cl. 1957).
81 CPA §§ 324-28, 351-54.
82 CPLR 3101 (b).
s3 CPLR 3101 (c).
84 CPLR 3101 (d).
85 43 Misc. 2d 173, 250 N.Y.S.2d 664 (Sup. Ct 1964). But see, It re
Newbridge Ave., 50 Misc. 2d 101, 269 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Sup. Ct 1966), which
denied disclosure of the expert opinions on the theory that the requirements
of CPLR 3101 (d) had not been met.
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city in the acquiring of property. Therefore, the court held that
discovery was proper.
In a recent case,8 6 the court used CPLR 3101(d) to deny
disclosure of appraisals which had been prepared for litigation.
Even though the court recognized that there was a trend towards
requiring pretrial discovery of appraisals because of the special
nature of a condemnation proceeding, it held that without a
showing of inability to duplicate or undue hardship, discovery
must be denied.
Legislative Changes
The different positions of the various New York courts as
to the proper method of disposing of pretrial disclosure claims in
condemnation cases has led to two recent legislative developments.
In 1965, the legislature enacted an amendment to the Court of
Claims Act 7 which requires an exchange of appraisals no less
than one hundred and twenty days from the date of the filing
of the claim. The need for such an innovation resulted from
the out-dated New York procedures for acquiring property which
were keyed to infrequent acquisitions.8 8 The purpose of the act
was to insure more settlements, avoid undue waste of time at
trials, and guarantee that right and justice would prevail.8 9 The
new amendment appears to have been successful in accomplishing
86 It re Brooklyn Bridge Southwest Urban Renewal Project, 50 Misc. 2d
478, 270 N.Y.S.2d 703 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
87 COURT OF CLAImS RULE 25(a) provides in part that:
1. Within six (6) months from the date of the filing of a claim in an
appropriation case the parties shall file with the Clerk of the Court
four (4) copies of their appraisals ...
2. When the Clerk shall have received the appraisal reports of all parties
he shall send to each attorney of record a copy of the appraisal report
of all other parties to the claim.
3. Within thirty (30) days after the service upon a party of an appraisal
report of any other party, any party to the proceeding may file and
serve on all other parties an amended or supplemental appraisal report
or reports.
4. Within sixty (60) days after the final filing. . . a party may because
of unusual developments . . . make a motion for permission to file
and serve an additional appraisal report . . . the granting of which
6 . . shall rest in the sound discretion of the Court ...
6. (a) Upon the trial of a claim for the appropriation of property the
parties shall be precluded from offering any proof on matters not
contained in the appraisal reports or amended . . . appraisal reports.
7. Six (6) months after the filing of a claim . . . a judge may conduct
a pre-trial conference. ..
88 STATE OF NEW YORK Com imTEE ON LAND ACQUISITION LAW & PRO-
cEDuRES 6, March 1966.8 9 Id. at 122.
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its objectives in that the first case tried under its requirements
was expeditiously handled. 90
However, there has been one major objection to the new
enactment. It allows the parties to file an amended appraisal,
as of right, within 30 days of the original filing.9 1 This has led
to an abuse whereby one of the parties to the litigation files a
one-sheet appraisal and the other files a detailed report. The one-
sheet appraisal, for all practical purposes, is useless, and the right
to amend has given one party the advantage of using his adversary's
appraisal. There is presently a movement to amend rule 25(a)
to provide for the filing of supplemental appraisals only upon a
showing of special circumstances. 92
The second major legislative proposal was an amendment to
CPLR 3101 which would eliminate subparagraph (c) and add a
new subparagraph which would require mandatory pretrial dis-
covery in condemnation cases in all the courts in the state.93
The Judicial Conference which proposed the amendment felt that
this change would lead to more expeditious handling of con-
demnation cases within the supreme court because such free dis-
closure is presently hampered by the material-prepared-for-litigation
provision in the CPLR.94  However, this amendment was vetoed
by the Governor after passage in the legislature, the principal
objection being that it invited "disuniformity" by having the
individual courts establish their own rules rather than one definitive
statewide procedure.95  It was the opinion of the Conference that
if a uniform practice was submitted in a future amendment, the
Governor's objections would be satisfied.96
A recent study 97 of condemnation procedure in Nassau County
has pointed out many of the existing disparities in the New York
system. The report stated that in 48 per cent of the land takings
in Nassau, the county paid less than its lowest appraisal. In
90 COURT OF CLAIMS SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR 11, June
1966. For a case upholding the new amendment see Route 304 Realty Corp. v.
State, 49 Misc. 2d 438, 267 N.Y.S.2d 530 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
91 Op. cit. supra note 88, at 125. The original proposal provided this
could be done only by a motion to the court with sufficient reasons.
92 Id. at 131.
9 1966 N. Y. LEG. Doc. No. 90, FLEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 209. The amendment would read, "if the rules of the
particular court shall so provide, a party in condemnation ... proceedings
may . . . obtain from his adversary the latter's appraisals and the data on
which they are based."
94 Id. at 203-04. See In re Newbridge Ave., 50 Misc. 2d 101, 269 N.Y.S.2d
874 (Sup. Ct 1966).
9 7B McKiNEY's CPLR 3101, supp. commentary 12 (1966).
90 Ibid.
97 BERGER & ROHAN, SURVEY OF NASSAU COUNTY'S CONDEMNATION
PROCEDURES (1966).
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another 39 per cent of the takings, the compensation figure ranged
between 90 and 109 per cent of the county's lowest appraisal-' s
The report further indicated that the amount of compensation paid
varied according to the manner of the disposition of the claim,
but did not vary significantly with the presence or absence of an
attorney.9 The authors argued that the failure of the condemnor
to pay the full value of its appraisal might violate the constitutional
duty to pay "full compensation." 100 The study proposed two
alternatives: (1) the county could start negotiation at the full
value of the lowest appraisal with a 10 per cent variance figure;
or (2) negotiations could begin at 90-95 per cent with variance
up to the full value of the appraisal.' 0 ' The authors of the study
recognized the various inherent problems involved in such proposals,
but felt that either of the two proposals would better insure the
condemnee of just compensation.
Conclusion
From the above discussion, it would appear that some states
have made noteworthy progress in the area of pretrial discovery
in condemnation cases. The judicial and statutory law in such
jurisdictions as California, Wisconsin and New York have indicated
that the free disclosure of appraisal reports has led to a more
equitable handling of the situation.
It appears that there is a new liberal tendency in both the
federal and state areas, favoring pretrial discovery in condemnation
cases. Due to the unique nature of a condemnation proceeding,
it is evident that additional measures for protection of the con-
demnee should be adopted. It is urged that a recognition of this
fact in a procedural rather than substantive law vein will cause
the veil of secrecy to be lifted in condemnation cases. The
inequity of a situation which allows the sovereign to negotiate
with an ignorant condemnee requires rectification. In this manner,
the condemnee who is losing his land through no fault of his own
will be better able to conduct proper and useful pretrial negotia-
tions in seeking to receive the just compensation reserved for him
by the constitution.
98 Id. at Table 7.
99 Id. at Tables 8 & 9-A.
100 Id. at 24.
101 Id. at 25-27.
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